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ABSTRACT
Water distribution systems are prone to transients since pumps need to be started and
stopped, pumps may have sudden flow changes, human blunders can occur, equipment may fail,
or other unavoidable natural events may ensue. Surge modeling techniques are available to
calculate variations in pressure, under extreme or normal operating conditions, serving as a tool
to predict extreme events in order to design a suitable system and, or, to aid in the
implementation of proper measures to mitigate transients. However, modeling an entire water
network system may not be cost effective and may require extensive research and time especially
in large distribution systems. Spatial analysis may offer an efficient alternative method of
uncovering areas with potential problems. In this research, spatial statistic methods were
employed to find whether clustering of leak events is occurring, the distance at which the leak
clustering is most prevalent, and the location of the leak concentrations. Specifically, the
following spatial statistic methods were utilized: nearest neighbor, Ripley’s K-function, and the
Gi* local statistic. The objective for this research was to locate stations with high concentrations
of leaks and whether these leak clusters were related to pump trips due to power failures.
Although the concentration of leaks was found near two stations, a correlation between the
cluster of leaks and the pump trips was not established.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Study Area
The Baton Rouge Water Company (BRWC) serves an area of roughly one hundred and
fifty square miles and has approximately 8.1 million linear feet of water mains. Over two
hundred and forty thousand customers in the region rely on the service provided by the
Company. This water system is composed of 65 wells, 39 pump stations, 15 house pumps, 12
enclosed storage facilities, 1 station with solely a booster pump, and 1 reservoir. Founded in
1910, the Company is faced with aging infrastructure and fragile pipe materials, such as asbestos
cement, that may be more vulnerable to transient wave conditions that can damage pipes and
lead to water losses. The Company’s water system is comprised largely of cast iron (roughly
41%), polyvinyl chloride (roughly 23%), and asbestos cement (roughly 18%); the remainder
18% of mains are permastrand, steel, ductile iron, tubing, galvanized, polyethylene, and copper.
1.2 Water Loss
Water loss can be classified as apparent or real. Apparent losses involve such factors as
errors in the metering system, unauthorized consumption, unmeasured use, and billing and
consumption errors. Real losses involve issues with the physical system such as leaks from pipes,
joints, fittings, tanks, hydrants, reservoir, and reservoir overflow.
Real water loss stems from leaks in the water system that may or may not be easily
detectable. Many leaks occur below the ground and often seep into the drainage system not
surfacing to the ground level where they can be detected. Several factors may cause leaks in the
system but one possible cause has recently come into focus by some researchers, the transient
wave effect.
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1.3 Transient Wave Effect
Water main leaks may occur from pipes damaged by transient wave effect. One of these
transient effects arises from rapid fluid velocity changes that can generate extremely low and
high pressure spikes in the distribution system. The low pressure point disperses as a low
pressure, high velocity wave thus creating water column separation in the pipes. Vacuum
pressures develop within the pipe that, depending on the duration, may cause vapor cavities
which can have adverse effects on pipes such as pipe collapse. The collapse of the vapor cavities
as the pipeline re-pressurizes generates localized low and high pressures that can cause pipe
failure (Phalempin, 2009).
Transient wave conditions are normally evaluated to prevent extreme events that occur
due to rapid changes such as power failures. However, a transient wave can travel roughly 1 mile
in a mere 1.5 seconds at speeds up to 4,000 fps (feet per second) (under normal circumstances
water travels in the pipe at about 5-6 fps) depending on pipe characteristics. Generators located
at stations with pumps providing back-up power, require about a 35-45 second initiation. The
inherent delay in the starting of the generators prevents the units from initiating swiftly enough
to keep a pump running. This delay provides plenty of opportunity for the creation of a transient
event in the absence of appropriate precautionary measures. If the transient wave encounters a
capped end, for example, it will travel back to the source at the same speed and time. If measures
are not taken to mitigate the power in the transient wave, damage to piping, valves, or pumps can
occur. Thus, fluctuations in the flow state can adversely affect water pipes and assets (Hollis,
pers. comm.).
Surge models are available that attempt to predict and simulate the extent of transients
and variations in pressure under current or hypothetical conditions of a system. However,
2

modeling an entire distribution system in a proper manner, accounting for the specific
characteristics of the system in question, requires extensive research and time. Spatial analysis
may be beneficial to perform in large distribution systems, such as the Baton Rouge Water
Company’s system, in an effort to isolate areas of concern. Thence, the areas of concern can be
further investigated.
The transient wave effect will be explored in this research as a factor in real losses.
Specifically, this research will attempt to explain the leaks produced from the damaging effects
of power-outage-created transient wave events.
1.3 Objectives
Power failures create transient wave events that lead to pipe damage and leaks (water loss).
Therefore, geographical concentration of leaks near a pump station may indicate that pressure
fluctuations and power outage events may have a correlation. Spatial analysis methods offer a
manageable approach to identifying locations of concentrations on which to focus further
examination and to perform time-intensive methods such as surge modeling.
Thus, performing analysis to find the concentration of leaks, the frequency of leaks,
power outage time of occurrence, and power outage frequency should detect a relationship, or
the lack thereof, with transient wave events.
The main tasks performed are as follows: 1) Data containing the location of main,
hydrant, service, and meter leaks over the past thirty nine months (October, 2006 – January,
2010) is geocoded (mapped) in order to examine the spatial distribution and the temporal
distribution of the leaks. The proposed method of analysis is the application of spatial statistics;
specifically, average nearest neighbor, multi-distance spatial autocorrelation (Ripley’s K
function), and hot-spot analysis (Gi* statistic). 2) Data containing station outages is examined to
3

review the temporal dispersion and the frequency of station power outages over the past thirty
nine months. 3) Then, a comparison is performed between the concentration and frequency of
leaks with the frequency, location, and time of power outages. 4) The stations that exhibit
statistically significant leak concentrations are compared to transient (surge) wave models
generated of the stations isolated by the spatial analysis.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Water Loss
Water supply seemed plentiful and infinite for many years in most of the world’s water
systems. Therefore, water loss was largely disregarded and considered an intrinsic part of a water
supplying operation. However, the growth of our cities, the limits of water resources, and
regulation costs have forced the industry to evaluate its operations. Surprisingly, water loss
control is not widely practiced worldwide (Thornton, Sturm, Kunkel, 2008).
There are two principally recognized types of water loss: Real and apparent losses.
Apparent losses are not produced by the physical loss of water but are rather due to errors in
consumption and billing as well as metering errors and unmeasured or illegal consumption.
However, apparent losses can have a large impact on revenues and is an important aspect of
water loss (Thornton, Sturm, Kunkel, 2008).
Real losses occur in the physical distribution system in which the water seeps from pipes,
fittings, joints, hydrants, enclosed storage facilities (e.g. tanks), and reservoirs. It is also an
important aspect of water loss. This research project will deal only with the real loss category
(Thornton, Sturm, Kunkel, 2008).
Real losses are typically either reported, unreported, or background leaks. Reported leaks
are usually breaks that cause high flow rates, are easily detectable, cause service disruptions, and
are, therefore, reported within a short period of time. Conversely, unreported leaks have medium
flow rates, are not easily detectable, run for long periods of time, and are usually found by leak
detection equipment. Background leaks are seepages in pipe joints and connections too small to
even be exposed by leak detection equipment. They run for quite long periods of time slowly
worsening until reaching the point of being detectable. Background leakage reduction is possible
5

through pressure management and replacement of faulty infrastructure (Thornton, Sturm,
Kunkel, 2008).
Reported events that involve large main breaks are perceived to have the largest impact in
water loss. However, these events are usually short in duration since these disruptions in service
are quickly resolved. Small concealed leaks, on the contrary, can cause much larger volumes of
water loss and can potentially run for years before they are detected and repaired. Recently, the
relationships between pressure and leakage rates demonstrate that certain leaks, such as joint
leaks (usually found in AC piping or old hydraulic couplings), are extremely vulnerable to
fluctuations in pressure; PVC or plastic based pipes and high background leakages are also
vulnerable to pressure fluctuations (Thornton, Sturm, Kunkel, 2008).
Remote sensor technologies, such as the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) system, monitor the water distribution system and can aid in the isolation of leaks on a
large scale. The data provided by the SCADA system can be used for analysis of source (pump
stations and tanks), transmission lines, and of the distribution system (Beecher, Flowers, 1999).
2.2 Surge Pressure
There are two types of pressure surges: transient and cyclic. Cyclic pressure surging, as
the name implies, is recurring in nature by the fluctuating action of equipment such as
reciprocating pumps, un-dampened pressure control valves or interacting pressure regulating
valves, wavering demand, etc. Cyclic surges may result in fatigue damage. Transient surges
occur in a rapid period of time shifting from one steady state to another. This is commonly
termed as water hammer (Moser, Folkman, 2008).
Water main leaks may occur from pipes damaged by transient wave effect. One of these
transient effects arises from rapid fluid velocity changes that can generate extremely low and
6

high pressure spikes in the distribution system. The low pressure point disperses as a low
pressure, high velocity wave thus creating water column separation in the pipes (Figure 1).
Vacuum pressures develop within the pipe that, depending on the duration, may cause vapor
cavities which can have adverse effects on pipes such as pipe collapse. The collapse of vapor
cavities as the pipeline re-pressurizes generates localized low and high pressures; high pressures
can damage pumps, valves, and cause pipe rupture (Phalempin, 2009).

Figure 1. Formation of vapor cavity and its collapse (by permission: Wood, per. comm.)

The degree of severity of transient event pressures, created by a particular change in velocity, is
dependent on the geometry of the water system, the amount in velocity change, and the speed of
the wave in a particular system. The wave speed is dependent on pipe modulus of elasticity, pipe
diameter (the smaller the diameter, the faster the wave speed), pipe thickness (the thinner the
walls, the lower the wave speed), fluid modulus of elasticity (the higher the value, the faster the
wave speed), pipe restraints (unrestrained pipes allow more movement of the pipe which slows
the wave speed), fluid density and modulus (wave speed increases with modulus and decreases
7

with density of the fluid), and amount of air in the fluid (Moser, Folkman, 2008; Wood, pers.
comm.; Hollis, pers. comm.).
Rapid flow changes due to sudden valve closure and pump stoppages may result in large
scale pressure waves. Essentially, transient events are disruptions during transitions from one
constant state to another. The disrupted state of the pressure waves propagate through the
distribution system with sound wave velocity, acoustic or sonic, depending on the water
properties and pipe elasticity. As the waves spread through the system, transient flow conditions
are generated which can lead to equipment damage, system fatigue, and pipe failure. Friction and
damping in the system will slowly re-stabilize the waves to a steady state. However, smooth
transitions to this state can only be achieved with careful slow flow regulation and in the absence
of large fluctuations in pressure and flow. Typically, events that can initiate a sequence of
transient waves, which are transmitted and reflected at discontinuities in the system (pipe
junctions, pumps, open or closed ends, etc.) fall in the following categories: 1) pump starting and
stopping; 2) valve closing and opening; 3) boundary pressure changes such as tank and reservoir
water level drop, tank pressure change, etc.; 4) drastic shift in water demand such as in flushing
of hydrants; 5) water transmission changes such as main breaks; 6) pipe air releasing; 7)
regulator or check valve activity (Wood, 2005).
Transients are likely to occur in water distribution systems since water system pumping
units need to be started and stopped, have sudden flow changes, human error, equipment failure,
and other natural occurrences that are unavoidable. Transient regimes are most notable at pump
stations, control valves, low static pressure spots, high elevation areas, and remote locations
distant from tanks. Transients are particularly intense from rapid transitions such as those
formed from power failure or emergency valve operations (Jung, Karney, Boulos, Wood, 2007).
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Vapor cavity formation is associated with a net flow away from the cavitation point. As
such, a pump component in the water system is considered only if and when a vapor pocket
formation occurs on the discharge side. An uncontrolled pump shutdown (e.g. 2 second pump
run down) can create a severe transient where cavitation occurs (at -14 psig – pounds per square
inch gage) and then peaks (e.g. to 150 psig). Sub-atmospheric pressures are likely to occur
throughout the water distribution system during this event (Wood, Lingireddy, Boulos, 2005).
Localized drops in pressure can release dissolved gas (air) from the water stimulating
corrosion of steel and iron pipes. Consequently, this leads to the formation of rust and pipeline
damage. Transient protection such as relief valves or air chambers when improperly designed
and regulated, may provide a means for contaminants to enter the water system. In certain
circumstances, such as when a main breaks, the normal chlorine residual may not adequately
treat the contamination (Wood, Lingireddy, Boulos, 2005).
Transient analysis is a fundamental part of good water distribution system design and
operation and is an integral part in estimating worst-case scenarios. However, the transient effect
in distribution systems are susceptible to unique characteristics and simplified analysis methods
may result in deficient surge protection. Furthermore, the implications of water quality from
leaks due to pressure fluctuation disturbances can result in the detachment of biofilm, resuspension of settled particles, and the intrusion of contaminated groundwater (Jung, Karney,
Boulos, Wood, 2007; Wood, Lingireddy, Boulos, Karney, McPherson, 2005).
Transient wave surge design guidelines such as guidelines published by the American
Water Works Association (Manual M11, Steel Water Pipe – A Guide for Design and Installation,
2004; Manual M23, PVC [polyvinyl chloride] Pipe – Design and Installation, 2002; and C40300, Selection of Asbestos – Cement Transmission Pipe, Sizes 18in. Through 42 in., 2000) are
9

geared largely towards simple systems; a sudden event on a single main pipe. Thus, the
seemingly conservative guidelines may actually be insufficient and consequently costly.
According to the guidelines, the relationship between pressure increase and the increase in fluid
velocity is unrelated to the length of the pipe. However, this does not account for friction losses
that can greatly increase or decrease surge pressure nor does it account for the system depth
variations. Additionally, pipe diameter, pipe thickness, pipe material type, water elasticity, water
density, water temperature, as well as air and solid contents in the water, all affect wave velocity.
Some of these characteristics are quite complex and are challenging to ascertain. Although
estimates of the highest wave velocity relate to the largest potential wave, it may not necessarily
correspond to the actual largest wave surge. The aforementioned characteristics are vital to wave
surge analysis and to good dependable design (Jung, Karney, Boulos, Wood, 2007).
Furthermore, general design guidelines pertain to simple, homogeneous water systems
whose relationships do not account for dissimilar pipe properties that create distinctive transient
surge wave reflections. Nor do they account for the effect of friction. The product of a reflected
wave in a single pipe will depend on the characteristics of the pipe at each segment. Thus, the
result of this event affects the severity of the transient wave effect (Jung, Karney, Boulos, Wood,
2007).
In a complex system of mains the pipes can be the source of transient waves or act as a
transmitter/receiver, and thus, by the nature of its own topology, affecting increases in pressure.
Again, the varied pipe functions are important considerations in analysis and design. However,
there is a risk of either insufficient or over-sufficient pipe design in that one creates a safety issue
and the other a cost issue (Jung, Karney, Boulos, Wood, 2007).
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To complicate matters, main networks consist of junctions and dead ends that create
wave refractions and reflections with the ability to intensify or diminish wave surges.
Distribution systems may lack the adequate surge analysis and design that take into account the
varied loadings while focusing on worse-case scenarios (Jung, Karney, Boulos, Wood, 2007).
In terms of maximum pressure, the relatively small rotational inertia produced by
contemporary pumps during power outages creates sudden changes that are not particularly rare
in occurrence. Consequently, the estimated potential surge, using conventional generalized
analysis methods, may not anticipate the ultimate pressures created by a distribution system’s
diverse dynamics. In the case of loops, designed to provide system reliability and flexibility in
complex systems, conventional analysis may draw erroneous assumptions in reference to
transient wave effect (Jung, Karney, Boulos, Wood, 2007).
Another shortcoming of some conventional analysis’ expressions is that they do not
consider liquid column separation. As stated in more detail earlier, pressures below liquid vapor
pressure create flow vapor cavities. The collapse of these cavities produces a substantial pressure
increase that can damage pipeline systems (Jung, Karney, Boulos, Wood, 2007).
Surge simulation models are available that are capable of accurately predicting transients
and pressure fluctuations of a water distribution system. Currently, the two most commonly used
approaches in modeling applications are the method of characteristics (MOC) and the wave
characteristic method (WCM). The MOC is an accurate technique for surge simulation.
However, the MOC requires copious steps or computations to solve common transient issues. In
fact, more complex and substantial distribution systems require a greater number of calculations.
Conversely, the WCM approach requires fewer flow and pressure calculations and can
accommodate large distribution system computations in an effective and efficient manner. The
11

wave characteristics method is founded on the notion that transient pipe flow is the resulting
effect of a disturbance in the system leading to the creation and transmission of pressure waves. .
Although, both the MOC and WCM methods entail numerous calculations to arrive at a
solution, the WCM method requires fewer calculations. Both the MOC and the WCM
approaches will nearly always arrive at same solution for computations of the same system, with
the same data, same model characteristics, and to the same accuracy. Therefore, both approaches
can accurately predict transient pressures and flows in a water distribution system (Wood,
Lingireddy, Boulos, Karney, McPherson, 2005).
Surge modeling is a suitable tool in designing pre-emptive measures to properly control
and prevent fluctuating pressures and disastrous transient events. In any case, surge simulation
models require proper development and calibration to effectively predict improper or extreme
conditions in a distribution network (Wood, Lingireddy, Boulos, Karney, McPherson, 2005).
Nevertheless, conducting a surge analysis for an entire water system may not be suitable
if there is only a mere suspicion of a transient related problem. Additionally, because surge
modeling requires meticulous and extensive research an time, an analysis of an entire network,
especially a large water system, may not be cost effective. Spatial analysis methods are available
to efficiently identify a problem area(s) so as to merit further examination.
2.3 Pipe Characteristics and the Consequences
Pipes of differing materials have characteristics that may make them more or less
vulnerable to certain conditions such as surge pressures, vacuum pressures, ground movement
(expansive soils), soil subsidence, corrosion, etc.
Expansive soils, primarily expansive clays, are subject to seasonal moisture content
fluctuations. In dry periods the soil shrinks. The rewetting over the years causes the soil to swell
12

imposing lateral and vertical bending on pipes that may lead to longitudinal or circumferential
fractures (Holtz, Kovacs, 1981; Owen, pers. comm.).
Corrosion is an electrochemical reaction between a metal and its surroundings. This
reaction alters the properties of the metal. Corrosion occurs when the metals in the pipe are not in
concert with the water it contacts. Factors that are likely to influence corrosion are: soil
resistivity, moisture content, ground water influence, pH of the water, chlorides in the soil, soil
sulfides, redox potential (electrical potential of a metal), bi-metallic considerations (pipe
connections, stops), and known corrosive environments (HDR Eng. Inc., 2001; DIPRA, 2006).
Cast iron has an elastic modulus value, the tendency to be deformed elastically, between
10 x 106 to 15 x 106 lbs/in2 (Table 1) depending on the ratio of the pipe’s inside diameter to the
pipe’s wall thickness. Ductile iron is a material that has an elastic modulus value of 24 x 10 6
lb/in2. Steel, having the next highest modulus value of 29.5 x 106 lb/in2, also has the potential for
the highest wave speeds (3000-5000 ft/s). In general, rigid pipes such as ductile and cast iron
generate high wave speeds (approximately 2000-4500 ft/s) (Figure 2) and are vulnerable to
breaks from high pressure spikes. Ductile iron pipe is essentially more flexible or more yielding
than gray cast iron. However, it contains similar brittle properties as gray cast iron. The rate of
corrosion in ductile iron is also similar to that of gray cast iron. Nevertheless, ductile iron’s wall
is thinner, therefore, corrosion is more significant. Ductile iron that is lined with cement-mortar
contains some corrosion protection and an improved hydraulic efficacy. Ductile iron can
withstand a great amount of bending before failing allowing for stress redistribution and for
potential stress reduction. Higher strength steel pipes are more brittle and thin steel can collapse
under vacuum pressures. Steel is also susceptible to corrosion (Moser, Folkman, 2008; Owen,
pers. comm.; Hollis, pers. comm.).
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Asbestos cement (AC) is generally considered a rigid pipe. Nevertheless, it does possess
some flexibility. The elastic modulus value of AC is 3.4 x 10 6 lbs/in2 and is a durable material
that is less prone to impact damage as some rigid pipes. Unfortunately, AC pipe is vulnerable to
vacuum pressures, breaks from high pressure pipes, and breaks from soil shrink and swell
(Moser, Folkman, 2008; Hollis, pers. comm.).
Table 1. Elastic Modulus values
Material

Elastic Modulus

Steel

29.5 x 106 lb/in2

Ductile Iron

24 x 106 lb/in2

Cast Iron

10 x 106 to 15 x 106 lbs/in2

Asbestos Cement

3.4 x 106 lbs/in2

PVC

4 x 105 lb/in2

PE

1 x 105 lb/in2

Thermoplastics include such materials as polyvinyl chloride (PVC), polyethylene (PE),
polybutyline (PB), and acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS). Thermoplastic pipes such as PVC
and PE generate lower wave speeds (generally 1200-1500 ft/s), are corrosion resistant, and have
outstanding deformation to earth-load transfer ratio performance characteristics (the ability to
undergo localized strains without failure). Sustained operating pressures in the system do not
usually lead to failure in PVC piping. However, continuous high cyclic loading along with
extreme peak pressures, can result in PVC premature failure. Polyvinyl chloride pipes are not
subject to biological deterioration. Conversely, polyethylene pipes are more vulnerable to
environmental stress cracking where there is accelerated degradation when contact with
particular chemicals and high stress levels act concurrently; there are grades of PE that are highly
resistant to stress cracking as well as weather-resistant, and are high in density such as grade P34
14

(Type III, class C, category 5). Due to polyethylene’s rather low elastic modulus value of
100,000 lb/in2 (or 1 x 105 lb/in2), it is prone to ring compression stresses resulting in
circumferential ring shortening. Higher-density PE is characterized by superior stiffness, tensile
strength, and hardness along with a decrease in toughness, impact strength (at lower
temperatures), and long-term crack resistance. Both PVC and PE are susceptible to collapse
under vacuum pressures (Moser, Folkman, 2008; Hollis, pers. comm.).

Figure 2. Pressure wave velocity by material (by permission: Wood, pers. comm.)
2.4 Controlling Excessive Pressure Surges
A variety of means exist to provide surge control in the event of a transient wave
incident. These measures attempt to alter the flow velocity by dawdling or accelerating in an
15

adequately gradual manner. Ideally, a mixture of devices may be used to prevent and control
upsurges (high pressure events) and downsurges (low pressure events such as a pump power
failure). However, because of the complexity of transient behavior, devices meant to control
transient conditions, if not properly selected, located, or used, may induce an event (Wood,
Lingireddy, Boulos, 2005).
Common surge protection devices include: surge tanks (open, closed, one way, etc.),
pressure relief valves, surge anticipation valves, air release/vacuum valves, check valves, pump
bypass line, resistive component bypass line (Wood, Lingireddy, Boulos, 2005).
Generally, surge tanks serve the following purposes: 1) prevent high pressures by
temporarily storing excess liquid after a shutoffs, 2) prevent low pressure and potential cavitation
by temporarily introducing liquid into a region of low pressure in the water system (Wood,
Lingireddy, Boulos, 2005).
The purpose of an air release or vacuum valve is to prevent low pressure (cavitation) by
drawing air into the pipe when pressure goes below atmospheric in high point areas. Once the
pipe pressurizes to above atmospheric, the air is ejected. Nonetheless, air that is ejected too
quickly can result in air slams which may create a secondary surge in pressure. Therefore,
careful valve selection, use, and location are vital (Wood, Lingireddy, Boulos, 2005).
Pump bypass lines are installed with a check valve to prevent back flow from the pump
discharge to the suction side. The bypass prevents the buildup of high pressures on the pump
suction side and cavitation on the discharge side. A pump bypass set-up is designed for locations
in the system that contains such equipment as a booster pump; where substantial suction head
exists. The check valves are one-way flow schemes which prevent flow reversal. However,
response time delays and possible rapid opening and closing cycles can cause severe transient
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events; significant backflow may occur since these valves do not close instantaneously possibly
causing surges. Again, careful design and use of these valves are crucial (Wood, Lingireddy,
Boulos, 2005).
2.5 Overview of Spatial Statistical Methods
Spatial statistics allows for the comparison of the spatial distribution of features in a
geographic area to an assumed random spatial distribution in order to execute actual spatial
pattern analysis. Generally speaking, the basis of comparison is expressed by the dispersion of
the values around the mean (standard deviation or variance). A statistical analysis performed in
a dataset will show whether a trend or a pattern exists and whether it is statistically significant,
that is, if the distribution differs from a random distribution. Geographic spatial statistics
analyzes features that are associated with locations on the surface of the earth. The nature of
geographic data, data collection and storage methods, and study-area boundary choices affect the
outcome of the analysis. Assumptions that patterns and relationships are not influenced by
external factors, or observations not influencing one another, or that each observation is equally
likely to occur, contradict the nature of geographic data. The equal likelihood that features or
values occur at any location does not express the regional and local tendencies of the majority of
geographic data (Mitchell, 2009).
In order to identify patterns, a distribution of observed features is compared to a
hypothetical random distribution using the same number of features over the same area as the
observed number of features and area. A statistic is calculated for the observed and the random
distribution. The randomization sampling routine postulates that an observed spatial pattern of
the data denotes one of other possible spatial arrangements. The null hypothesis would be that if
the random sampling is performed an infinite number of times, the result of the pattern is not
17

significantly different from the observed pattern. If the null hypothesis is rejected at the specified
significance level, the observed pattern of values significantly differs from the random pattern.
The degree which the observed distribution departs from the random is the extent that the pattern
is either more clustered or more dispersed than the random distribution (Mitchell, 2009).
Spatial statistical methods calculate a test statistic as it calculates the initial statistic. The
Z-score is a common measure of test statistic reported in spatial analysis. It is a reference
measure for the standard normal with a standard deviation of one and a mean of zero (Mitchell,
2009).
The Nearest neighbor index is one of the methods of measuring the pattern of feature
locations. Ecologists Phillip Clark and Frances Evans’ research lead to the nearest neighbor
index development in the 1950s. The method was developed to measure patterns in distributions
of various plant species. The distance between each feature and its nearest neighbor is calculated
then the average, or mean, of these distances is computed. Essentially, the distances between
each pair of nearest neighbors are combined then the result is divided by the number of features
to obtain the mean distance ̅ o (Equation 1). The index compares the similarities between the
mean distance and the expected mean distance for the hypothetical random distribution
(Mitchell, 2009).
The mean distance for the observed
distribution of features

̅o=

∑

Measure the distance for each feature’s
nearest neighbor (Ci ), and sum the
distances…
…then divide by the number of
features

Equation 1. Nearest neighbor mean distance (adapted from Mitchell, 2009)
The nearest neighbor index may either be the difference, d = ̅ o - ̅ e, or the ratio, r = ̅ o /
̅ e, between the observed and the expected distance (Equations 2 and 3 respectively). If the mean
distance of the observed features is less than the mean of the random distribution then the
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observed is more clustered than the random distribution. In order to obtain the index, the distance
is calculated by subtracting the expected mean distance from the observed mean distance. The
difference is zero if the observed and the expected means are equal. Therefore, the observed
distribution is a random distribution. If the difference is less than zero, that is negative, the
expected mean is greater than the observed mean and the observed distribution is clustered. The
opposite is true for a dispersed distribution where the expected mean is less than the observed
and the difference is greater than zero (Mitchell, 2009).

The nearest neighbor
index as the difference
as the difference

Subtract the mean
distance for an
expected random
distribution from
the mean distance
for the observed
distribution

̅o‾ ̅e

The mean distance for the
observed distribution of features
∑
Measure the distance to each feature’s
̅o=
nearest neighbor (Ci), and sum the
distances… then divide by the number of
features
The expected mean distance
for a random distribution

̅e=

√

Divide 0.5 by the square root of
the number of features divided the
area

Equation 2. Nearest neighbor index as a difference (adapted from Mitchell, 2009)
In the ratio method, r = ̅ o / ̅ e, of the nearest neighbor index calculation (Equation 3), if
the means are the same the ratio is one and the distribution is random. If the ratio is less than one
so that the expected mean is greater than the observed, the distribution is clustered. In fact, the
closer the ratio is to zero the more clustered the arrangement; zero is the value for a completely
clustered distribution. In other words, the smaller the average distance between the features are
from that of the random distribution, the more clustered. Conversely, if the ratio is greater than
one, the expected mean is less than the observed mean and the result is a dispersed distribution
(Mitchell, 2009).
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̅

The nearest neighbor index
as a ratio

Divide the observed mean distance by the
expected mean distance for a random distribution

̅

Equation 3. Nearest neighbor index as a ratio (adapted from Mitchell, 2009)
The null hypothesis for testing the nearest neighbor index is that the features are
randomly distributed. The Z-score test is calculated via the division of the difference between the
observed and the expected by the standard error (Equation 4) (Mitchell, 2009).
̅

̅

The Z-score

The expected mean distance is subtracted
from the observed mean distance…
…and the difference divided by the standard
error

Equation 4. The Z-score (adapted from Mitchell, 2009)
The standard error, SE, (Equation 5) quantifies the distribution of mean distances about
their average value. It is the equivalent to the standard deviation of the mean distance for all
features in the data set divided by the square root of the number of features. A positive Z-score,
the observed mean distance is greater than the expected mean distance, denotes a dispersed
distribution. A negative Z-score, the observed mean distance is less than the expected mean
distance, denotes a clustered distribution. The Z-score would have to be greater than 1.96 or less
than -1.96 to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance level (Mitchell, 2009).

The standard error

SE =

0.26136 (a constant derived from the
radius of a circle) is divided by…

√

… the square root of the number of features
squared (n2) divided by the areal extent (A) of
the study area

Equation 5. The standard error (adapted from Mitchell, 2009)
Another method for measuring the pattern of feature locations is counting the number of
neighboring features within defined distances of each feature, and then totaling the values. To
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achieve this, a distance interval is specified and the average number of neighboring features
within the distance of each feature is calculated. A distribution is considered clustered if the
average number of features at a certain distance is larger than the average concentration of
features throughout the study area. In other words, it is clustered if the number of features within
a given distance is larger than that of a random distribution. This method is named Ripley’s Kstatistic after statistician Brian Ripley. It is a univariate, second-order, two-dimensional space
analysis of point patterns. The second order term relates to the analysis of all point-to-point
distances rather than the mean inter-point distances used in the nearest neighbor, a first-order
analysis. The K-function includes all neighbors within the specified distance. K represents the
number of distance ranges that will be established around each feature. The maximum distance is
determined by calculating half the maximum dimension of the study area. The resulting value is
divided by the number of bands stated to calculate the distance intervals. Generally, the greater
the amount of bands the smoother the chart curve and the easier it is to identify the distance at
which clustering peaks. Eventually, increasing the amount of bands further will no longer
provide useful information (Mitchell, 2009; Woodall, 2002).
The K-function is basically a descriptor of the extent to which spatial dependence exists
in the distribution of the events. Specifically, the K-function is calculated by finding the distance
from each feature location to every other feature location. Surrounding features are counted
within the specified distance of the feature. A K-value, K(d), is then calculated at each distance
for the number of bands stipulated (Equation 6) (Gatrell, Bailey, Diggle, Rowlingson, 1996;
Mitchell, 2009).
In order to determine if a pattern exists, the observed K value at each distance is
compared to the expected K value for a random distribution; the random distribution is
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calculated given the same area and number of features. K-values increase as distances increase.
Therefore, K-values are transformed (Equation 7) so to achieve a reasonable Y-axis chart height
for ease of interpretation. The transformation technique used is referred to as the L(d) method in
which the square root of the resulting multiplication of the area for the number of features in a
certain distance divided by π and multiplied by all the possible number of pairs (Mitchell, 2009).

The value of the K statistic
at a given distance (d)

( )

The distance (d) is measured between each target
feature (i) and every other feature (j); each distance is
multiplied by the weight for the pair (Iij), and all these
values are summed (i ≠ j) means the distance between
the target and itself is not included in the sum),,,

∑ ∑

… then the result is multiplied by the area (A)
divided by the number of features (n) squared

Equation 6. The value of the K-statistic at a distance (adapted from Mitchell, 2009)
The L(d) method produces an expected value for any distance, given a random
distribution of features, that is the distance (d) itself. The distribution is clustered if the observed
L value at a particular distance is greater than the expected value for a random distribution. If the
observed value is lower than the expected, the distribution is dispersed. A larger L value denotes
a larger number of features at a particular distance and clustering ensues where a peak of these
values in the chart occur at that distance. A pattern is statistically significant when the observed
distribution falls outside the confidence limits for a random distribution. In order to calculate the
confidence limits, x- and y-coordinate values are randomly created and the L values calculated at
each distance for that distribution. Since there may be a wide variety of possible values between
two random distributions, several iterations of the random distribution can be processed to attain
a range of possible L values. A confidence envelope, or confidence interval, is estimated by
selecting the highest and lowest value at each distance from these simulations to form the upper
and lower bounds of the envelope. A pattern that is a statistically significant cluster, that is the
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null hypothesis of spatial randomness is rejected, at a given distance is indicated by an observed
L value that exceeds the upper confidence limit. A statistically significant dispersed distribution
is indicated by an observed L value that is below the lower confidence limit (Mitchell, 2009;
Woodall, 2002).
The distance (d) is measured between each target
feature (i) and every other feature (j); each distance
is multiplied by the weight for the pair (Iij), which
is one if within the distance and zero if not…

∑ ∑
The value of the L at
a given distance (d)

( )

√
(

…the distances are summed (excluding the
distance between the target and itself) and
multiplied by the area (A)…

)

…then the result is divided by pi times the number of possible point pairs represented
as the number of points (n) times the number less one; and the square root is taken

Equation 7. The L(d) transformation method (adapted from Mitchell, 2009)
Features that are neighboring the edge of a study boundary may bias the results of the Kfunction. These features have fewer neighbors, may be at further distances with fewer
surrounding points and so are susceptible to edge effects. Edge effects may occur when features
outside of the boundary are not included in the calculation even if these are within the specified
distance. K-statistic calculation methods, such as the inclusion of edge simulation, are available
to remedy this effect (Mitchell, 2009; Dixon, 2002).
Ripley’s K (cumulative pairs over a distance) is a spatial association measure among
others such as Getis and Ord’s Gi* measure of local clustering (Getis, 2008).
The Gi* statistic is constructed on the premise that a spatial association exists between
observations to a distance. This local statistic theory is dependent on a critical distance
specification beyond which clustering of high or low values no longer increases. It is inferred
then that the spatial association ends at the critical value. A spatial weights matrix defines
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important parameters for the calculation of the Gi* (pronounced g-i-star) statistic. It is an
essential part of this analysis and is the formal representation of spatial dependence between
observations (Getis, Aldstadt, 2003).
Identifying clusters of features with similar values of a particular characteristic involves
examining the attribution of each feature and its neighboring features, along with the proximity
of these features. A statistical calculation for each point reveals the extent of similarity of nearby
feature values for a particular characteristic. These statistical values can be plotted spatially to
visually identify the clusters of features with similar values. Mapping the features in this manner
provides a statistically sound method for identifying clusters of points with a similar
characteristic. It is a determination that the likelihood that a feature with similar values as its
neighbors is not simply due to chance (Mitchell, 2009).
In a case where the value of the target feature is a factor in the outcome of a clustered
pattern, a Gi* local statistic is most appropriate technique for identifying clusters of similar
value, hot spots or cold spots. The Gi* is either based on a neighborhood of feature adjacency or
a specified distance. The length used in a distance-based neighborhood is dependent on the
researcher’s knowledge of the events and their behavior. Distances are characterized as straightline, Euclidian, or as travel time over a street network or overland (Mitchell, 2009).
A Gi* statistic, Gi*(d), is calculated by summing the values of the neighbors and dividing
by the sum of all the study area features’ values (Equation 8). Because a binary weight is used, as
either adjacency neighbors or distance neighbors, the characteristic values are multiplied by one
for neighbors and zero for others; which is the same as the sum of the neighbors’ values.
Therefore, only neighbors are included (Mitchell, 2009).
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∑
Gi* for a feature (i),
at a distance (d)

The value of each neighbor
(xj), is multiplied by the
weight for the targetneighbor pair (wij), and the
results summed …

( )

( )

…then the sum is divided by
the sum of the values of all
neighbors (xj), that is, all
features in the data set

∑

Equation 8. Gi* statistic calculation (adapted from Mitchell, 2009)
Feature groupings with high Gi* values denotes a concentration of features with high
attribute values, or a hot spot. A cold spot is indicated by groupings of features with low Gi*
values. A Gi* value near zero denotes that there is no apparent cluster of values. A lack of
feature concentration is a result of surrounding values near the mean or a target point that is
surrounded by a mix of high and low values (Mitchell, 2009; Getis, Aldstadt, 2003).
The statistical significance of the Gi* is tested by calculating a Z-score. The Z-score
calculation (Z (Gi*)), in this case, is performed by subtracting the expected Gi* for the feature in
a random distribution from the calculated Gi* value then dividing the difference by the square
root of the variance of all the features within the study extent (Equation 9) (Mitchell, 2009).

The Z-score for Gi*

(

)

(
√

(

)
)

The expected Gi* value
is subtracted from the
observed Gi*…
…and the difference
divided by the square
root of the variance

Equation 9. The Z-score for Gi* (adapted from Mitchell, 2009)
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The sum of the weights for a particular distance divided by the number of features in the
study area minus one (Equation 10) results in the expected Gi* (E (Gi*)) for a random
distribution (Mitchell, 2009).

∑
The expected Gi* value

(

)

( )

The weights (wij ) at a distance
(d) are summed…
…and divided by the number
of features (n), minus one

Equation 10. The expected Gi* value - random distribution (adapted from Mitchell, 2009)
Similar to the Gi* value, a high Z-score for a feature indicates neighbors with high
attribute values and a feature with low Z-score value indicates neighbors with low attribute
values at a given distance. If the Z-score is near zero, there is no evident cluster of similar values.
A statistically significant Z-score is either lower or higher than the confidence limits, that is, falls
outside the standard normal distribution; for a 95% confidence level, a Z-score that is either
greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 (Mitchell, 2009).
Gi* results, however, can also be influenced by edge effects. Because the neighborhood
is determined either by adjacency or distance, features near the boundary of the study area tend
to have fewer neighbors and may, therefore, receive greater importance in the calculation
skewing the results. Furthermore, the effect of any outliers in an analysis involving a small
number of features, say less than thirty, might produce results that are suspect. A local statistic,
such as the Gi*, is intended for use in identifying clusters that have an indeterminate clustering
or dispersion pattern throughout the region of study (Mitchell, 2009).
Table 2 is a summary of the three types of spatial analysis discussed and the
corresponding values that indicate clustering, randomness, or dispersion of values.
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Table 2. Summary of statistically significant spatial patterns at the 95% confidence level
Nearest Neighbor

Ripley's K-function

Gi* statistic

Clustered: Z-score is

< -1.96

> 1.96

> 1.96 or < -1.96

Dispersed: Z-score is

> 1.96

< -1.96

-

<=1.96 & >= -1.96

<=1.96 & >= -1.96

<=1.96 & >= -1.96

Random: Z-score is

2.6 Shrinking and Swelling Soils Overview
Certain types of soil have a moisture content that can be subjected to significant volume
changes. Specifically, fine-grained clay soils have a shrinking and swelling tendency. Swelling,
or expansive, soils are composed of clay minerals which attract and absorb moisture. Soil
shrinkage occurs mainly on the upper layers of the soil. As moisture content declines, surface
tension increases. The result is overall soil volume decline. Once the soil is subjected to
moisture, the swelling process begins. The likelihood of shrinkage and/or swelling may be
classified as very high, high, medium, and low (Holtz, Kovacs, 1981).
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHODS
3.1 Study Area - The Baton Rouge Water Works Company
The Baton Rouge Water Company is located in East Baton Parish but also serves
customers in the northeastern part of Iberville Parish, Louisiana. The purity of its water is owed
to water drawn from wells in underground rock and sand formations that travels in the geologic
subsurface structure from the Vicksburg, Mississippi area.
The first well was drilled in 1889 before the Company became known as The Baton
Rouge Water Works Company. Two reservoirs were constructed with a total capacity of
1,325,000 gallons. One of these, the Lula Resevoir, still remains in service. By 1973 the
Company had some 47 wells ranging from 1,000 to 3,000 feet in depth. The pipes totaled 982
miles and the average daily pumping rate was 31,885,540 gallons per day (Clayton, 1973).
Today the Company covers 150 square miles with approximately 1,500 miles of main.
Serving over 240,000 customers, the Company supplies the area with an average of 55,096,000
gallons of water per day (The Baton Rouge Water Works Company - Report, 2009). Its system
is composed of 65 water wells, 39 stations with pumps, 15 house pumps, 12 enclosed storage
facilities, 1 station with solely a booster pump, and 1 reservoir (Figure 3).
The service area is composed of pipe segments that can range from 10 feet to
approximately 1,000 feet in length. The pipe materials present in the system are polyvinyl
chloride, asbestos cement, cast iron, permastrand, steel, ductile iron, tubing, galvanized,
polyethylene, and to some extent copper. The change in elevation ranges from about
approximately 30 to 60 feet.
The Baton Rouge Water Works nonrevenue water in 2008 totaled 293,983,298 gallons
with 12,810,930 gallons attributed to leaks (The Baton Rouge Water Works Company
28

Figure 3. The Baton Rouge Water Works distribution system as of December 3, 2009
29

Summary, 2008). In 2009 the Company produced 20,069,321,673 gallons of water. The
nonrevenue water for 2009 totaled 544,976,471 gallons with 199,598,530 gallons stemming from
leaks in the system (The Baton Rouge Water Works Company - Summary, 2009).
3.2 Data Collected for Analysis
The Baton Rouge Water Works Company produces monthly reports on main, hydrant,
service, and meter leaks along with other service order quality control issues. The records are
maintained for a period of roughly three years after which they are purged. The records contain
service address and details on the results of the service order outcome; an example of the data
records is shown on Table 3. A report for a period of thirty nine months (October 15, 2006
through January 19, 2010) was generated and the report was thoroughly examined and any
unrelated and duplicate records were removed (The Baton Rouge Water Works Company
Quality Assurance Log, 2006-2010).
A SCADA system was installed at the Company in the late seventies and updated in the
nineties. The SCADA AlarmView component maintains records of station power outages (Table
4). Data was extracted to review thirty nine months of activity (October 15, 2006 - January 19,
2010) (The Baton Rouge Water Works Company, 2006-2010).
Table 3. Quality Assurance Log example entries
Entry
Date
20061015
20070111
20080731
20080303
20090805
20100116

Reason
41
41
41
42
42
40

Address
1 Applewood Rd
2 Aurora Pl
3 Churchill Ave
4 Compton Ct
5 Lee Dr
6 Ardenwood Dr N

Zipcode
70808
70806
70808
70809
70808
70806
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Follow-up
Repaired 2 1/2" PVC Main
Repaired 2 1/2" PVC Main
Repaired 8" CI Main
Repaired Service Line
Repaired 2" GA Main
Repaired Hydrant

Table 4. Example of the SCADA AlarmView power failure log

Date Time
02/15/2010 09:31:45
03/07/2007 14:34:15
06/09/2009 15:20:25
03/07/2007 14:34:15
01/22/2007 15:50:27
04/24/2008 06:04:05

Company
B
B
B
B
B
B

Name
I_12
LULA21
LULA_E
PRESCT
SOUTER
TEXAS

Outage
Utility Power
Utility Power
Utility Power
Utility Power
Utility Power
Utility Power

Event
Normal
Fail
Normal
Fail
Fail
Normal

3.3 Methodology and Techniques
Cases studies have been conducted to compare simplified and comprehensive surge
analysis indicating the need for system-specific analysis. However, to our knowledge no studies
have been conducted to actually show the extent of transient wave effect on pipeline damage or
to show the relationship in spatial terms.
Transient events caused by pump trips can potentially lead to pipe system damage such
that leaks would become evident, and would cluster, in areas in close proximity to pump stations.
Leak and station power failure activity was reviewed and then analyzed to discover whether such
a relationship exists in this study area; the entire spatial and frequency analysis, spatial data
preparation, manipulation, and graphing components of this study were conducted using ESRI
ArcGIS software.
First, a report containing main, hydrant, service, and meter leaks for the thirty nine month
period was examined and any unrelated and duplicate records removed. The main, hydrant,
service, and meter leaks were then geocoded in order to conduct spatial distribution analysis. The
geocoding resulted in 99% address matching (Figure 4); out of 5,263 addresses, 5,236 matched,
27 tied and 11 were unmatched.
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Figure 4. Geocoding results
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Initially, the raw geocoded data was processed with the average nearest neighbor distance
(Equation 1, Section 2.5) spatial statistic to determine whether spatial clustering is evident. The
average nearest neighbor statistic calculates the average distance from a feature’s own location to
its nearest neighbor. The Manhattan distance approach was chosen as the method of distance
calculation since water mains follow a city block model; as opposed to Euclidean, straight line,
method of distance calculation which is appropriate for continuous data. In addition, the study
area size was defined to 5,664,423,037 square feet in order to more accurately represent the
extent of the study area and to ensure that every feature in the study area is captured during this
analysis. This method of analyzing patterns is based on inferential statistics providing a broad
measure of spatial pattern. The null hypothesis for the average nearest neighbor distance spatial
statistic assumes that the features are randomly distributed or lack spatial pattern. Nearest
Neighbor ratios below one indicate clustering.
Additional processes were applied to the data in preparation for the hot spot analysis (Gi*
local statistic – Equation 8, Section 2.5). First, the geocoded data was rendered to combine
coincident features. A new attribute (field) is created in this process to store the number of
coincident features. Then, a spatial weights matrix file was created using a fixed distance and,
since water mains follow a city block model, the Manhattan method of distance calculation.
Then, the multi-distance spatial cluster analysis (Ripley’s K-function statistic – Equation 6,
Section 2.5) was employed to determine the distance, or distances, that exhibit clustering. The
multi-distance function assumes the pattern of weighted points is not significantly more clustered
than the underlying features.
Twenty bands were used to provide an adequate level of distance intervals for proper
identification of the distance at which clustering peaks. Ninety-nine permutations were used for
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the confidence envelope calculation; the choices include 9 simulations for a 90% confidence
level, 99 simulations for 99% confidence level, and 999 simulations for 99.9% confidence level.
The weight attribute containing the number of features at each location in the rendered layer was
used for the multi-distance analysis for a proper feature weight assessment. The simulate outer
boundary values method of boundary correction was chosen to resolve any underestimates that
may occur near the edges of the study area boundary; lack of neighboring points can skew the
data. This method mirrors points across the study area boundary so that edge points will have
more truthful neighbor estimates. Other methods include, reduce analysis area, which is not
available when a study boundary file is used, and the Ripley’s edge correction, which is
appropriate for very square or rectangular study areas. Additionally, since the K-function is
sensitive to study area size, a boundary layer was used to more accurately represent the extent of
the study area. The K-function is an effective means to summarize spatial dependence of
different scales or distances (Bailey, Gatrell, 1995).
A hot-spot analysis was performed using the rendered dataset, the spatial weights matrix
file, and the distance identified in the multi-distance spatial cluster analysis that was most
pronounced and statistically significant. The weight matrix used in the hot spot analysis was
computed by using the Fixed Distance Band method of conceptualization of spatial relationships.
This method was applied so as to define whether neighboring features which fall inside the
specified critical distance receive a weight of 1, and exert influence on computations for the
target feature, or a weight of zero, falling outside the critical distance, and have no influence. The
threshold distance (critical distance) for the fixed distance band is the significantly-clustered
distance result from the K-function analysis. Again, the Manhattan method of distance
calculation was applied to the matrix as main vectors follow a city-block configuration.
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Finally, eight neighbors were selected as the number of neighbors to consider in the calculation
so that each feature will have at least this many neighbors. This technique ensures that, when
necessary, at least the requested amount of neighbors are used; in this scenario the threshold
distance may be temporarily extended.
The hot spot analysis should provide a better understanding of the leak concentrations. In
the hot-spot analysis a Getis-Ord Gi* statistic is calculated for each instance or event. A Z-score
and p-value is computed for each event demonstrating the spatial distribution and clustering of
high and low values. An event that is a statistically significant hot-spot has a high value and is
surrounded by events with high values. In essence, the local sum for an event and surrounding
neighbors is evaluated relative to the sum of all events. If the local sum is considerably different
from the expected sum and the difference is too great to be the result of random chance, then a
statistically significant Z-score is assigned to that event. Large positive Z-scores with small pvalues (less than or equal to 0.05) indicate intense clustering of high values, hot spots, and
smaller Z-scores with small p-values indicate clustering of low values or cold-spots.
Leak time of occurrence and frequency was examined and compared with the power
failure temporal and frequency data over a period of thirty-nine months. The SCADA system
provided the data containing station activity. The temporal and frequency data for leaks and
power failures in areas demonstrating a concentration of leaks near a pump station were graphed.
The goal was to uncover a close relationship between frequency and time of leaks with the
frequency and time of power failures.
Furthermore, a comparison of the resulting leak clusters near stations was made with
hydraulic surge models of the same areas. The model was prepared and conducted by Chris
Morris, Hydraulic Systems Analyst at Owen & White Inc., Consulting Engineers.
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The transient modeling process begins with a steady-state hydraulic procedure in
WaterCAD (Bently Systems, Inc.). A peak-hour customer demand of 0.65 gpm (gallons per
minute) with a combination of wells, booster pumps, and booster stations is established to fulfill
the demand and maintain the system pressures within normal operating ranges; A total of
104,190 gpm or 150 MGD (millions of gallons a day) flow rate. A sub-model of the area of
interest is extracted after the steady state is achieved. The sub-model is then exported to a file
containing the elements and its attributes necessary for the transient analysis in the Surge2010
software (KYPipe LLC). The newly imported data is compared to the WaterCAD main water
system configuration for accuracy and any loss of information during the transfer process.
Additionally, modifications to run the steady-state simulation are necessary to account for
demands and inflow from lines outside of the sub-model. Other information such as pump
characteristics (speed, head, flow inertia, efficiency, and torque – as a function of flow and
speed) are also entered into the model for the Surge2010 simulation. Another component of the
surge model is the wave speed of certain piping materials. In the areas of interest, a speed of
3600 ft/s was assigned to ductile iron and 2000 ft/s for PVC pipe. Finally, a transient surge
simulation is performed. The simulation begins with a steady-state condition for five seconds
followed by a pump failure. The resulting output comprises of maximum and minimum pressures
that will reveal areas requiring investigation. A profile of questionable areas may be generated to
display the pipeline, hydraulic grade line, maximum and minimum pressures in order to visualize
transient wave propagation (Morris, 2011).
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Nearest Neighbor Analysis
The results of the nearest neighbor procedure demonstrated clustering of the leak events
with a ratio of 0.52 and a -66.39 Z score value (Figure 5); unlike the hot spot analysis, this
method provides resulting statistics and does not provide an output of the data that can be
mapped. At the significance level of 0.01, we reject the hypothesis that this distribution is
random and conclude that the leak distribution is clustered. Consequently, further analysis was
performed to discover the extent of clustering.

Figure 5. Average Nearest Neighbor Distance results
4.2 Ripley’s K Function
Subsequently, the multi-distance spatial cluster analysis (Ripley’s K-function) was
performed to explore at which scale or scales clustering is occurring and to later apply the
distance of interest to the hot spot analysis. The results of the analysis show, on 99 simulations
(99% confidence level), that clustering is most pronounced and statistically significant at 6,389
feet (1.21 miles) (Table 5).
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The distance correlated with largest difference between the expected and the observed
values indicates the distance in which clustering is most pronounced. Positive DiffK values
indicate clustering and are statistically significant if the ObservedK values fall outside the
confidence envelope; negative DiffK values that fall outside of the confidence envelope indicate
statistically significant dispersion. Figure 6 illustrates the distances of the ObservedK (red line)
associated with the positive DiffK values, demonstrating clustering, are above the ExpectedK
(blue line). Conversely, the negative DiffK values indicating dispersion are below the
ExpectedK. The highest DiffK positive value (6,389 feet) is the peak of clustering and will be
used in the hot-spot analysis.
Table 5. Multi-Distance Spatial Cluster Analysis (Ripley’s K-function) results
ExpectedK
(miles)
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.81
1.01
1.21
1.41
1.61
1.81
2.02
2.22
2.42
2.62
2.82
3.02
3.23
3.43
3.63
3.83
4.03

ExpectedK
(feet)
1064.75
2129.50
3194.26
4259.01
5323.76
6388.51
7453.26
8518.01
9582.77
10647.50
11712.30
12777.00
13841.80
14906.50
15971.30
17036.00
18100.80
19165.50
20230.30
21295.00

ObservedK
(feet)
1562.83
2799.79
3957.20
5072.37
6171.65
7250.25
8292.12
9290.65
10255.90
11205.90
12137.80
13032.40
13895.00
14747.80
15586.70
16415.10
17228.70
18024.60
18805.90
19586.20
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DiffK
(feet)
498.08
670.29
762.95
813.37
847.89
861.74
838.86
772.63
673.17
558.34
425.55
255.38
53.26
-158.69
-384.61
-620.97
-872.12
-1140.93
-1424.35
-1708.86

LwConfEnv
(feet)
1510.96
2736.66
3881.34
4989.43
6068.98
7123.28
8148.83
9140.32
10097.10
11032.00
11952.30
12839.00
13702.80
14554.90
15392.70
16218.90
17032.40
17825.30
18601.50
19373.20

HiConfEnv
(feet)
1548.48
2783.82
3949.50
5075.21
6171.16
7245.71
8282.54
9281.15
10250.50
11197.10
12125.00
13016.80
13885.00
14735.10
15576.20
16409.90
17225.90
18024.50
18806.80
19591.50

Figure 6. Multi-Distance Spatial Cluster Analysis results
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4.3 Gi* Local Statistic
The resulting distance value from the K-function analysis, 6,389 feet, was then applied to
the hot spot analysis. As previously mentioned, this analysis was performed using the rendered
dataset and a spatial weights matrix file containing the Fixed Distance Band method of
conceptualization of spatial relationships, the threshold distance (6,389 feet), the Manhattan
method of distance calculation, and eight as the number of neighbors to consider in the
calculation so that each feature will have an adequate amount of neighbors.
The results of the hot spot analysis reveals that statistically significant Z-scores are higher
than the confidence limits, that is, fall outside the standard normal distribution with a 95%
confidence level; Z-scores of feature locations are greater than 1.96 with a 95% confidence level
exhibiting clustering of events. Consequently, two main station locations are surrounded by high
activity of leaks (Figure 7). The Prescott and the Texas tank stations. The characteristics of these
two locations are summarized as on Table 6.
Table 6. Characteristics of Prescott Road and Texas Street
Prescott Road

Texas Street

8” suction, 6” & 16” CI discharge

8” suction, 6” & 16” CI discharge

16” & 12” CI, 8” PVC distribution lines

Into 16” AC distribution line

Pump bypass, 6” check & 10” altitude valve Pump bypass, 6” check &12” altitude valve
Overhead tank, no wells

Overhead tank, no wells

Velocity: 1.36 fps

Velocity: 1.76 fps

15 HP/1770 RPM Booster pump

20 HP/1775 RPM Booster pump

Output: ~ 850 GPM

Output: ~1,100 GPM

Distribution lines 59% CI, 21% PVC

Distribution lines 52% CI, 21% PVC

Infrastructure age: 40-50+ years old

Infrastructure age: 40-50+ years old
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Figure 7. Hot spot analysis results
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These stations share similar characteristics. Both of the stations are comprised of
overhead tanks, booster pumps, pump bypass lines, altitude valves, and, among other elements,
contain the oldest infrastructure in the Baton Rouge Water Company’s system. Similarly, the
majority of pipe material for both stations consists of cast iron and PVC. Cast iron and PVC are
pre-disposed to possible transient wave effect damage. While cast iron is susceptible to breaks
from high pressure spikes, PVC is prone to collapse under vacuum pressures.
4.4 Frequency and Temporal Evaluation
To further scrutinize whether the concentrations of breaks in these two areas are due to
repeated power failures, a frequency of power failure events was generated for all of the stations
in the system (Table 7). Surprisingly, Prescott Road and Texas Street do not have the highest
power failure rate. As a comparison, the four stations with the highest frequency of power
failures are shown on Table 8. These stations exhibit quite differing characteristics to those of
Prescott Road and Texas Street; the stations are I-12, Lula 21 and East (combined due to their
proximity to one another – a few hundred feet) , and Souter Drive. However, the Texas Street
tank station had forty-two failures and the Prescott station had twenty-six failures in the thirtynine month period of the study. The amount of failures still warrants closer investigation. Figure
8 displays the location of the stations along with the leak hot spots and the frequency of power
failure values.
Next, the power failure and leak events were analyzed for coincidence of leaks and power
failure time of occurrence. The simplest and most direct method of comparing these incidents is
by plotting the values. Graphs were generated for Prescott Road and Texas Street and are shown
on Figures 9 and 10 respectively. A close inspection of these graphs reveals that no evident
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Table 7. Power failure frequency by station
Frequency
117
106
88
68
58
52
49
48
45
45
42
42
39
37
…
26
…

Site Name
Souter Drive
I-12
Lula East
Lula 21
North 45th
Briarwood Booster
Ridgecrest
Lafayette
Highland Road
Lula West
Bankston
Texas St
Government South
Government North
…
Presscott Rd
…

Table 8. Characteristics of stations with the highest number of power failures
I-12

Lula 21 & Lula East

Souter Drive

16” DI production discharge

10” CI, 16” CI & 18” ST

12” to 24” DI

Into 12” PVC distribution

Into 12” CI, 16” AC

2-24” DI. to 12” PVC

Air release

Air release

Air release

No overhead tank, 3 wells

No overhead tank, 2 wells

No overhead tank, 6 wells

7 fps

3.13, 2.53 fps

3.28 fps

200 HP: 1800 RPM pumps

150-200 HP: 1175-1780 RPM

200 HP: 1760-1800 RPM

~ 4,400 GPM (1-2 pumps on)

~ 1,100, 2,000 GPM (1-2 )

~ 5,000 GPM (3)

34% AC, 30% CI, 29% PVC

57% CI, 18% PVC, 13% GA

50% CI, 25% AC, 11% PVC

Infrastructure 30-35 yrs old

40-50+ yrs old

30-40 yrs old

43

Author: Dina S. Knight

Figure 8. Hot spot analysis results and station power failures
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Figure 9. Prescott Road station graph
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Figure 10. Texas Street station graph
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relationship exists. The times of power failure occurrences are not followed by a noticeable
increase in leak events in the days and few weeks that follow. The leak events time of occurrence
seemingly form concentrations much later than would be the case for making the relationship.
Leak events must appear within days or a few weeks of a power failure to merit theorizing a
temporal relationship.
4.5 Hydraulic Surge Modeling
The hydraulic surge model for the Prescott Road tank station was simulated using a tank
level at 75% (190.15 feet of elevation) and a booster pump output of 1440 gpm (gallons per
minute) at 30.2 feet of head. This tank has a capacity of 500,000 gallons and sits at a ground
elevation of 56.9 feet. The elevation to the bottom of the bowl is 163.9 feet and 198.9 feet to
overflow. The Texas Street tank station was simulated using a tank level at 75% (177.62 feet of
elevation) and a booster pump output of 1380 gpm (gallons per minute) at 45.8 feet of head. This
tank has a capacity of 1,000,000 gallons with a ground surface of 27 feet. The elevation to the
bottom of the bowl is 143.5 feet and 189 feet to overflow (Morris, 2011).
The hydraulic sub-model used for the Prescott Road and Texas Street tank stations
simulations are shown on Figures 11 and 12, respectively. The results of the modeling reveal that
the lowermost pressure that is reached following a pump trip simulation is 48.7 psig (pounds per
square inch) at 6.7 seconds at junction 502 (Figure 13) for the Prescott tank site (Figures 15 and
17). The lowermost pressure reached is 42.6 psig at 8.7 seconds at junction 3220 (Figure 14) for
the Texas tank site (Figures 16 and 18). Sub-atmospheric pressures of -14 psig and below must
be achieved for cavitation to occur and for possible pressure spikes, which may follow, to arise.
The steady-state HGL (hydraulic grade line) of the simulations, along with the pipeline
profile, were diagrammed from the booster pump to the junction where the lowest pressures are
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Figure 11. Prescott Road sub-system (Morris, 2011)

Figure 12. Texas Street sub-system (Morris, 2011)
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48.7 psig at 6.7
seconds after
failure
J-502

Prescott
Tank

Figure 13. Minimum pressure reached at Junction 502 (Morris, 2011)

Texas
Tank

42.6 psig at 8.7
seconds after
failure
J-3220

Figure 14. Minimum pressure reached during at Junction 3220 (Morris, 2011)
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Figure 15. Steady-state HGL for Prescott Road simulation (Morris, 2011)
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Figure 16. Steady-state HGL for Texas Street simulation (Morris, 2011)
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Figure 17. Lowermost pressure at 6.7 seconds for the Prescott Road simulation (Morris, 2011)
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Figure 18. Lowermost pressure at 8.7 seconds for the Texas Road simulation (Morris, 2011)
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realized for the Prescott Road and Texas Street tank stations (Figures 15 and 16, respectively);
HGL = Z + P/ where Z is the elevation above the datum, P is the pressure and  is the weight of
the fluid. In a pressurized water environment, the HGL is the level to which water would rise in a
vertical tube at any given location along the main. Diagrams follow (Figures 17 and 18)
illustrating the minimum HGL, the maximum HGL, and the extent of pressure fluctuations
during the simulated pump trip; the gray lines are the bounds for the lowest and highest pressures
that are reached during the simulated pump trip event (Walski, Chase, Savic. 2001).
Clearly, no apparent relationship can be presumed of the concentration of leaks near the
Prescott Road and Texas Street and power failures events.
4.6 Other Factors Influencing Breaks
The results of this study have shown a concentration of leak events surrounding two
stations. These concentrations lack a strong relationship with the power failure events. Therefore,
other factrors must be causing these leak incident clusters. Prospects, other than transient events,
may include soil shrink and swell and corrosion effects on mains of certain material (Figure 19steel (ST), ductile iron (DI), asbestos concrete (AC), polyvinyl chloride (PVC), and galvanized
(GA)).
ST
Collapse under vacuum pressures:

DI

CI

AC

*

Breaks from high pressure spikes:
Breaks from Shrink and Swell:

Corrode:
* Thin steel

Figure 19. Pipe material susceptibility
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Figure 20. Prescott Road’s shrink and swell potential
55

Author: Dina S. Knight

Figure 21. Texas Street’s shrink and swell potential
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Using data from the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service, Soil Survey Area
Version 7 (02/09/2010), Component Text data and corresponding digital spatial polygon soil
data, the areas were mapped to assess the possibility of shrink and swell (Figures 20 and 21).
The classification for probable expansion estimations range from very-high to low.
Generally, mains of smaller diameter, mainly of four- and six-inch, tend to be more vulnerable to
shrink and swell conditions that fall under the very-high category. Prescott’s surrounding area is
composed of soils that fall into low to medium classification indicating that shrink and swell is
not an issue of great concern. The Texas tank station has some areas of shrink and swell
classified as high. Nevertheless, the majority of this classification is either outside of the water
system or lacks high concentrations of leak events (Holts and Kovacs, 1981; Owen, pers.
comm.).
The Baton Rouge Water Works Company has a system comprising of several water
sources (tanks and wells) that provides a continuous supply and flow of water. This characteristic
may protect it, to some extent, against transients initiated by power failures (pump trips). In the
unlikely event that several pumps lose power at the same time along with the failure of power
back-up systems, a transient can generate. Additionally, other transients instigated by rapid valve
closure or opening, operational starting and stopping of pumps, tank water level drop, tank
pressure change, flushing of hydrants, change in demand, main breaks, regulator and check valve
activity may cause damage to a water system’s pipes, fittings, and valves. The Company’s
system has experienced damage from rapid valve closure, flushing of hydrants, and main breaks
(Morris, pers. comm.).
Other factors such as corrosion due to elements such as the pH of the water, moisture
content, resistivity of the pipe material, and redox potential (metal electrical potential) may cause
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damage that leads to localized leaks. These events tend to cluster in areas of certain
characteristics. The Prescott Road and Texas Street’s aging infrastructure consists of a high
percentage of cast iron material mains that are susceptible to corrosion. Further investigation is
necessary to explore the possibility of corrosion effects to the Company’s system.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Baton Rouge Water Company (BRWC) serves over two hundred and forty thousand
customers. It is a complex network of approximately 8.1 million linear feet of water mains, 65
wells, 39 pump stations, 15 house pumps, 12 enclosed storage facilities, 1 booster station, and 1
reservoir. The Company’s water system is comprised largely of cast iron (roughly 41%) and
polyvinyl chloride (roughly 23%).
Transient surges occur in a rapid period of time shifting from one steady state to another.
It is commonly termed as water hammer. The disrupted state of the pressure waves propagate
through the distribution system. The degree of severity of transient event pressures, created by a
particular change in velocity, is dependent on the geometry of the water system, the amount in
velocity change, and the speed of the wave in a particular system. Vacuum pressures that
develop within a pipe may cause vapor cavities which can have adverse effects on pipes such as
pipe collapse.
Surge models are available that can predict the extent of transients and variations in
pressure, under current or hypothetical conditions of a system. However, modeling an entire
distribution system in a proper manner, accounting for the specific characteristics of components
in a system, requires extensive research and time. Spatial analysis is an effective method to
employ in large distribution systems, such as the Baton Rouge Water Company’s system, in an
effort to isolate areas of concern. Thence, the areas of concern can then be further investigated.
Spatial statistics allows for the comparison of the spatial distribution of features in a
geographic area to an assumed random spatial distribution. Generally speaking, the basis of
comparison is expressed by the dispersion of the values around the mean (standard deviation or
variance). A statistical analysis performed in a dataset will show whether a trend or a pattern
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exists and whether it is statistically significant, that is, if the distribution differs from a random
distribution.
Three particular spatial analysis techniques were chosen to uncover possible clustering
patterns in the Baton Rouge Water Company’s system: nearest neighbor, multi-distance spatial
cluster analysis (Ripley’s K function), and hot spot analysis (Gi* statistic).
The nearest neighbor analysis is a quick and effective means to discover if a set of data
points exhibit a pattern that is clustered, dispersed, or simply random in nature. The solution is a
Z-score value denoted either as a negative number smaller than -1.96 for clustering events, or a
positive Z-value score greater than 1.96 for dispersed events at the 95% confidence level. The
larger the negative number the greater the clustering of events and vise-versa. The result of the
analysis for the study area, -66.39 (section 4.1), signifies a clustered pattern.
The multi-distance spatial cluster analysis (Ripley’s K-function) is a descriptor of the
extent to which spatial dependence exists in the distribution of the events. The K-function is
useful in determining the distance, or distances, that exhibit clustering. Values that are
statistically significant fall outside of the confidence envelope. A positive difference between the
expected and the observed values indicate clustering and are statistically significant if the
observed values fall outside the confidence envelope. The highest positive difference between
the observed and the expected is the point where clustering is most pronounced. The peak for
this study, at a 99% confidence level, is at 6,389 feet or 1.21 miles. A short enough distance for
leak events that may be related to power failure, or pump trip, induced transients. This is the
distance used in the hot-spot analysis.
The hot spot analysis (Gi* statistic) identifies clusters of features with similar values of a
particular characteristic. A high Z-score for a feature indicates neighbors with high attribute
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values and a feature with low Z-score value indicates neighbors with low attribute values at a
given distance. A statistically significant Z-score is either lower or higher than the confidence
limits, that is, falls outside the standard normal distribution; for a 95% confidence level, a Zscore that is either greater than 1.96 (clustering of high values) or less than -1.96 (clustering of
low values). The result of this analysis is shown on figures 7 and 8 where clustering of high
incident leaks surround the Prescott Road and the Texas Street tank stations.
The Prescott Road and Texas tank stations contain infrastructure that is over fifty percent
cast iron and over fifty years of age (Table 6) leading to a greater susceptibility to breaks
stemming from transient, shrink and swell, or corrosive environments (Figure 19). Both of these
stations are also comprised of over twenty percent PVC piping that is vulnerable (Figure 19) to
pipe collapse under vacuum pressures during a transient event.
A frequency analysis of power failure events for the study area (Table 7) reveals that
Prescott Road and Texas Street do not have the highest pump failure rate. The amount of failures
still warrants closer investigation. The pump failure and leak events were plotted (Figures 9 and
10). However, no evident correlation can be made since the times of power failure occurrences
are not followed by a noticeable increase in leak events in the days and few weeks that follow.
The leak events time of occurrence form concentrations much later in time. Leak events must
appear within days or a few weeks of a power failure to merit theorizing a temporal relationship.
A comparison of the resulting leak clusters near pump stations were made with
hydraulic surge models of the same areas. The results of the modeling reveal that the lowermost
pressure that is reached following a pump trip simulation is 48.7 psig for the Prescott Road site
(Figure 17) and 42.6 psig for the Texas Street site (Figure 18) for the Texas tank site.
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Sub-atmospheric pressures of -14 psig and below must be achieved for cavitation to occur and
for possible pressure spikes, which may follow, to arise.
Shrink and swell damage was quickly dismissed by simply mapping the mains vulnerable
to expansive soils against spatial soil data classified by each soil’s shrink-swell potential.
Undoubtedly, the concentration of leaks near the Prescott Road and Texas Street sites
cannot be correlated with pump failure transients. Nevertheless, other types of surge, such as
valve operation and fluctuating pressures, may possibly be responsible for causing damage that
leads to leaks. Moreover, the aging infrastructure in the Prescott and Texas tank areas may
facilitate damage from pressure surges and corrosion. Further investigation of both surge and
corrosive environments is suggested.
Additionally, capturing information in the Quality Assurance report such as the condition
of the impaired pipe and cause of the pipe failure is recommended. This would greatly diminish
the time and level of research necessary to resolve issues relating to leak concerns.
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APPENDIX
A LETTER OF PERMISSION
From: don wood [mailto:donjwood@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, October 23, 2011 6:01 PM
To: Dina Knight
Subject: Re: Thesis presentation
Dina:
You are welcome to use these slides. Good luck!
Don
-Dr. Don J. Wood
Professor Emeritus, University of KY.
Director, KYPIPE LLC
www.kypipe.com
From: Dina Knight
Sent: Sunday, October 23, 2011 3:00 PM
To: 'don@kypipe.com'
Subject: RE: Thesis presentation
Dr. Wood,
In April of this year I asked for permission to use some of your graphics in my thesis
presentation. I would like to ask for permission to use two graphics in my thesis document as
well. These are the “Events following a pump trip” (slide 29) and the “Pressure Wave Speed”
(graphic only on slide 48). Please let me know if that is acceptable.
Thank you kindly,
Dina S. Knight
Senior GIS Analyst
The Baton Rouge Water Works Company
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From: don wood [mailto:donjwood@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 4:28 PM
To: Dina Knight
Subject: Re: Thesis presentation
Dina:
You are certainly welcome to use any of the slides I presented in your presentation. If I can be of
any help please let me know. Certainly transients in the BR water system would be of interest to
me - especially looking at large distribution system models. Good Luck!
Don
-Dr. Don J. Wood
Professor Emeritus, University of KY.
Director, KYPIPE LLC
www.kypipe.com
From: Dina Knight
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 11:51 AM
To: 'don@kypipe.com'
Subject: Thesis presentation
Dr. Wood,
My name is Dina and I am currently working on my Masters at LSU. My topic relates to your
expertise, transient events. I watched your webcast (Surge Analysis Modeling – an Essential and
Manageable Task for Engineers) with IDModeling, which I thoroughly enjoyed. I would like to
request your permission to use some of the graphics shown on the webcast in my thesis
presentation in the fall. Please let me know if that is acceptable.
Thank you kindly,
Dina S. Knight
Senior GIS Analyst
The Baton Rouge Water Works Company
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Dina Knight is married and a native of Brazil. She has resided in the United States for the past
thirty one years. Ms. Knight has dual citizenship in the United States and in Brazil and speaks
Portuguese fluently. Her life in the United States began in the state of New Jersey. Ms. Knight
earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Geography from Rutgers, The State University of New
Jersey. She began her geospatial career at the Delaware Department of Transportation followed
by the New Castle Conservation District before accepting the position as a Research Associate at
Louisiana State University. Ms. Knight was a Research Associate at Louisiana State University
from January of 2000 until October of 2007. The majority of those years were spent at the Center
for GeoInformatics where she gained valuable knowledge in the area of Global Positioning
Systems, Real Time Networks, Virtual Reference Stations, along with furthering her geospatial
aptitude. She continues her career at the Baton Rouge Water Works Company and is currently
holding the position of Senior GIS Analyst.
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